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Is THE DOCTRINE OF DEVIATION ONLY A HISTORICAL
RECORD TODAY?
Sarunas Basijokas
Abstract - As of today the origins of the doctrine of deviation have not yet been
firmly established and probably never will be. However, that does not detract from the
fact that the doctrine itself has influenced shipping and general contract law and
continues to do so even in the modern times. House of Lords judgements in Photo
Productions v Securicor, Suisse Atlantique and their interpretations are posing a threat
to the continued existence of the deviation doctrine. This paper examines the roots of
the doctrine, its importance in sea carriage and intricacies of general contract law. The
research findings lead to the conclusion that the law community should not dismiss
the notion of deviation as it still remains a doctrine worth preserving.
A. INTRODUCTION
Deviation is a doctrine which has been widely discussed throughout the
past two centuries. Different judges viewed the doctrine from a variety of
angles and applied it either as an isolated rule of law or as a forming part
of a broader picture encompassing general contract law principles.
Deviation in simple terms is an unjustified voluntary departure of a ship
from the contracted route. At first sight one would not venture to think
that such a technical or navigational aspect of carriage of goods by sea
could raise legal issues carrying harsh ramifications for parties concerned
which to this day have not yet been authoritatively decided. However,
that is the reality which resulted in there being a vast array of
commentary about the subject raging from academically focused articles
in law journals' to divided opinions of the judges deciding deviation
cases.
C.P. Mills, 'The future of deviation in the law of the carriage of goods' [1983]
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 587; Charles Debattista,
'Fundamental Breach and Deviation in the Carriage of Goods by Sea' [1989] Journal
of Business Law 22; John Livermore, 'Deviation, Deck Cargo and Fundamental
Breach' (1990) 2 Journal of Contract Law 241; Simon Baughen, 'Does deviation still
matter?' [1991] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 70; Martin
Dockray, 'Deviation: a doctrine all at sea?' [2000] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial
Law Quarterly 76; J.R. Lee, 'The law of maritime deviation' (1972) 47 Tulane Law
Review 155; C.M.C. Cashmore, 'The legal nature of the doctrine of deviation' [1989]
Journal ofBusiness Law 492.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the roots of the deviation
doctrine, its relevance and importance in trade by sea, the proper route
definition, justified and unjustified deviation. Emphasis will be put on the
development of the deviation doctrine with regard to the consequences
arising upon the breach of an obligation not to deviate. In this particular
part of the paper I will thoroughly look into the most important cases,
fundamental breach doctrine and the survival or outcasting of the
deviation doctrine in the light of Suisse Atlantique2 and Photo
Productions v Securicor3 cases. The analysis of the breach of the ship
owner's obligation not to deviate and the effect it has on the parties will
be broken down time-wise into three parts - the first being the time from
1830s to 1890, the second part encompassing the period between years
1890 and 1936 and the last part - from 1939 onwards. These precise dates
were chosen to mark the most important cases that heavily influenced
decision making and legal opinion towards deviation and the effect of
breach.
This work on the deviation doctrine is mostly concerned with the
foundation of an implied duty of the ship owner not to venture off course.
Up until the decision in Davis v Garrett there was no clear authority
which stated that there was an implied duty not to deviate. However,
express agreements existed long before Davis v Garrett was decided that
usually described the exact route to be taken while on the marine journey.
Following parts of this paper are a mixture of both - origins of the duty
and general statements concern the overall obligation not to deviate with
the implied duty analysis encompassing 1830s and beyond.
B. CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVIATION AND CARGO INSURANCE
It should not be surprising that a doctrine attracting such an interest from
law academics, practitioners and judges alike stems from marine
adventures which took place 300 years ago. Therefore, the origins of the
doctrine are undoubtedly ancient dating back to the beginning of the
seventeenth century. The doctrine has been around in maritime texts as
2 Suisse Atlantique Soc. d'Armement Maritime SA v N. V Rotterdamische Kolen
Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361.
3 Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd. [ 1980] AC 827.
4 (1830) 6 Bing 716 (Court of Common Pleas).
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5
early as 1613. Modern law books describe deviation in a variety of ways
with each definition stressing the importance of authorization or lack
thereof and voluntariness. Deviation is an '...intentional adoption of a
route which differs from the contract route'. 6 John F. Wilson defines it as
'an intentional and unreasonable change in the geographic route of the
voyage as contracted 7 ; Martin Dockray describes it as an '....implied
term of the contract for the carriage of goods by sea that the carrier will
not deviate from the proper route without lawful justification' 8 ; according
to Scrutton deviation occurs when 'in the absence of express stipulations
to the contrary... the owner of the vessel... impliedly undertakes to
proceed in that ship by a usual and reasonable route without unjustifiable
departure from that route and without unreasonable delay'. 9 Law
academics and judges also agree on the fact that deviation is a breach of
contract of carriage. As to the consequences of such a breach there have
been harsh debates and erroneous court decisions which will be discussed
in the final part of this paper.
As far as the breach of contract is concerned there need not be any
conscious breach on the part of the shipowner or master. Deviation occurs
when there is a voluntary and unauthorized departure from the agreed or
usual / customary course. However, it does not necessarily mean that
there is a deviation every time the ship ventures off course. Consequently,
there will be no deviation which would amount to a breach of contract
when the ship strays off track as a result of other intervening factors like
storm, illness of ship's officers or reliance on defective navigational
equipment. In Rio Tinto v Seed Shipping the charterers shipped a cargo
at Glasgow for Huelva. The ship's master himself not being in good
health, ordered the ship to go in the wrong direction while misreading the
information provided by the compass. As the result of such actions the
ship stranded on rocks and sustained heavy damage.
s William Welwod, Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes (Thomas Man 1613) 25.
6 J. H. S. Cooke et al, Voyage Charters (3rd edn, LLP 2007) 251 (hereinafter - Voyage
Charters).
J. F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Longman 2010) 16.
8 Martin Dockray, Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (3rd edn,
Cavendish 2004) 63, 64.
9 S. C. Boyd, A. S. Burrows and D. Foxton, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of
Lading (21st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 231, 232.
10 (1926) 24 Lloyd's Rep 316.
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Per Roche J:
...the essence of deviation [is] that the parties contracting have voluntarily
substituted another voyage for that which has been insured. A mere departure or
failure to follow the contract voyage or route is not necessarily a deviation, or
every stranding which occurred in the course of a voyage would be a deviation,
because the voyage contracted for, I imagine, is in no case one which essentially
involves the necessity of stranding. It is a change of voyage, a radical breach of
contract that is required to, and essentially does, constitute a deviation...
The judge held that the master never intended to leave the contracted
route and all he did was to make a mistake as to the compass course due
to his ill health. Roche J concluded that the master '...was not on another
route; he was on the existing route, although he was out of the proper part
of the route which he ought to have followed'. Therefore, there was no
substitution or change of voyage which is a vital element when judging
whether there was a deviation or not.
The above statements of Roche J hold a connection with the primary
reason for the existence of the deviation doctrine. Law academics and
practitioners alike agree that the origins of the doctrine lie in marine
- 12insurance.
The doctrine of deviation is like a mirror image of classical marine
insurance rules which made a cargo policy void and cargo owner
uninsured when a ship deviated from the agreed route. Deviation in such
case equals a substitution for a voyage not contracted for by the parties,
hence the lapsing of insurance policy which exclusively covered the
primary agreed voyage. Judicial authority for such a view can be found in
Lavabre v Wilson case where Lord Mansfield held that '...true objection
to a deviation is not increase of risk .... It is that the party contracting has
voluntarily substituted another voyage for that which has been insured' .13
It might very well be so, however, to my mind it boils down to the
intentions of the parties. With the introduction of liberty to deviate
11 (1926) 24 Lloyd's Rep 316, 320.
12 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (OUP 2007) 309, 310; Michael Bridge,
The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice (OUP 2007) 919, 920; Simon
Baughen, Shipping Law (Routledge - Cavendish 2009) 101; A.D. Hughes, Casebook
on Carriage of Goods By Sea (2nd edn, Blackstone 1999) 80, 81; J.R. Lee, 'The law of
maritime deviation' (n 1) 155.
13 (1779) 99 ER 185, 189.
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clauses in contracts of carriage the end result would seem to be that the
importance of deviation concept has been greatly diminished. However,
we should not forget the rulings of Lord Wilberforce in Photo
Productions v Securicor and Longmore LJ in Daewoo Heavy Industries
Ltd. v Klipriver Shipping Ltd. (The Kapitan Petko Voivoda) 14 that allow
the deviation doctrine to survive if only on a thinnest string. These issues
are analysed in detail in the final part of this paper.
C. VOYAGE ROUTE
It is no wonder why deviation is such a frequent occurrence in maritime
voyages. Unlike trade by rail or road where there are exact roads or tracks
set out for the carriers to stick to, marine travel happens in an open sea.
Ships, the crew and cargo carried are always threatened by usually
unforeseeable maritime perils that can cause havoc at any stage of the
voyage. During the course of shipping history ocean travelers have
discovered certain trade routes that avoid known marine dangers,
established customs to use certain short-cuts and bunkering ports while
on the route. These happenings are very important in considering the
voyage route a ship has to take in order to comply with the deviation
rules. Unless the charterparty or a bill of lading dictates the route to be
followed from the loading port to the discharge port the master's
obligation is to follow the usual and customary course. It has been held in
Achille Lauro v Total15 that generally the usual route is to be the direct
geographical route. There is no denying that it is a clear presumption,
however we should not forget that all legal presumptions can be rebutted.
As the direct geographical route very frequently differs from the usual
customary course, parties to the dispute can put forward evidence of a
shipping line, trade route, usual bunkering locations or a commercial
custom to go around certain dangerous, unknown areas that would rebut
the geographically based presumption. Judicial approval for such a view
is to be found in Reardon Smith Line v Black Sea and Baltic General
Insurancel6 where a ship was chartered to carry a cargo from Ponti in the
Black Sea to the United States of America. The vessel grounded and
damaged its cargo at Constanza where she had gone to refuel. The
14 [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1, [13]-[15].
15 [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 247, 251.
16 [1939] AC 562 (HL).
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charterers based their claim on the fact that by going to Constanza the
ship had deviated from her contractual route.
Per Lord Porter:
In each case therefore when a ship is chartered to sail or when a parcel is
shipped upon a liner sailing from one port to another, it is necessary to inquire
what the usual route is. In some cases there may be more than one usual
route... It is not the geographical route but the usual route which has to be
followed, though in many cases the one may be the same as the other. But the
inquiry must always be, what is the usual route, and a route may become a
usual route in the case of a particular line though that line is accustomed to
follow a course which is not that adopted by the vessels belonging to other
lines or to other individuals. It is sufficient if there is a well known practice of
that line to call at a particular port.' 7
The House of Lords held that even if there had only been a short usage of
Constanza as a bunkering spot, it was still enough to establish it as a
usual bunkering location for ships on that particular route. What is
significant about this decision is that it expands the scope of deviation
doctrine in a sense that parties are not constrained to the direct
geographical route between the ports and can make commercial use of
trade lines which are only known to a few. This is not to say that
shipowners can create their own routes as they go, however a customary
route undeniably has to start with someone sensibly using a fueling point
or intermediate port for supplies. Support for the view that it all depends
on specific circumstances can be found in the decision of the Court of
Appeal in James Morrison Ltd. v Shaw, Savill and Albion'8 where
Swinfen Eady L.J. was of the opinion that it is impossible to have a 'hard
and fast rule' by which you could determine whether a certain stop point
was on the course of the voyage or not. He asserts that in such cases all
circumstances like the 'size and class of the ship', 'nature of the voyage',
'usual and customary course', 'the natural and usual ports of call', 'the
nature and the position of the port in question' have to be taken into
account. Therefore, ship owners who are aware of the conditions
described above have more wiggle room when on a voyage to reasonably
17 [1939] AC 562 at 584, 585.
18[1916] 2 KB 783.
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deviate in order to make the marine journey more safe, efficient or
profitable.
The notion of reasonableness when judging the voyage route had so
greatly influenced the courts that in the majority of cases substance
always had primacy over the printed clause. As per William Tetley and
Bruce Cleven '...the clause [was] of less importance than the actual
deviation'. 19 That was clearly evidenced in G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v
Palmyra Trading Corp.20 In that case the bill of lading provided for an
alternative port of discharge in case of strikes, quarantine, labour
troubles, lockouts or similar disturbances. Lord Morton of Henryton held
that the master had not deviated if he had reasonably chosen another port
in order to perform the contract. The learned provision only gave the
master freedom to choose another port if and when faced with the named
disturbances in the contracted port of discharge.21
D. LIBERTY TO DEVIATE CLAUSES
As evidenced above deviation is a very common happening in ocean
travel. Throughout the history ship owners and masters have always been
eager for more freedom whilst at sea. It turned out that their attempts to
achieve that had not been in vain as liberty to deviate clauses were
introduced in charterparties and bills of lading. As a consequence, the
common law duty not to deviate could then be contractually altered to
allow certain deviations from the agreed route. Not surprisingly, ship
owners had seen this as a very good opportunity to make use of such
stipulations in order to permit them to fit the voyage to their personal
preferences. The principle that English private law is based on freedom of
the parties to agree the content of their contractual relations provided a
fertile ground for ship owners' creativeness. In the end result some liberty
to deviate clauses became so wide in scope that the master at sea could
call at any port in any order. For example, Gencon Charter (1994 revised
edition) includes a deviation clause stating that 'the vessel has liberty to
call at any port or ports in any order, for any purpose...'. 22 A very similar
19 William Tetley and Bruce Cleven, 'Prosecuting the voyage' (1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev.
810, 812.
20 [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 379.
21 ibid 391.
22 Gencon Charter 1994 clause 3.
120
Is the Doctrine ofDeviation only a Historical Record Today?
wording can also be found in Asbatankvoy form.23 'The apogee' as
Simon Baughen2 4 called it of the widest liberty clause is to be found in
Connolly Shaw v A/S Det Nordefielkske D/S25 where the parties created a
clause which read that the ship can '...proceed to or return to and stay at
any ports or places whatsoever... in a contrary direction to or out of or
beyond the route... in any order... backwards or forwards... or for any
purpose whatsoever'. Such clauses in bills of lading and charter parties
undeniably created almost unlimited discretion upon the ship owners to
venture off course. This unbalance in the rights and duties of the parties
was restricted by English court decisions in Leduc v Ward2 6 and Glynn v
Margetson.27
In Leduc v Ward the direct route to the port of discharge was ignored
and the ship strayed off course sailing about 1200 miles in the wrong
direction.28 Lord Esher's judgement stressed out that even if the parties
contracted to give the master liberty to sail to any ports in any order, it
was always a question of interpretation of 'mercantile expression used in
a mercantile document'.29 Generally, mercantile transactions are
conducted between business people in the realms of business common
sense. The more the intention of the parties flouts business common sense
the less it is possible that parties have actually meant it. To my mind, that
was the reason Lord Esher came to the conclusion that even if the
contractual provision includes permission for the ship to sail to any ports
'...she would only be entitled to call at such ports in their geographical
order [and] ... that the ports must be ports substantially on the course of
the voyage'. 30 What conclusions could be drawn from this decision? It
would seem that the opening for ship owners to greatly manipulate the
conditions of the voyage had been shut. Lord Esher's approach was taken
even further in the House of Lords decision Glynn v Margetson. Charles
23 Clause 20 (vii).
24 Baughen, 'Does deviation still matter?' (n 1) 76, 77.
25 (1934) 49 Lloyd's Rep. 183.
26 (1888) 20 QBD 475 (Court of Appeal).
27 [1893] AC 351 (House of Lords).
28 Dockray, Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 8) 69.
29 Leduc v Ward (1888) 20 KBD 482.
30 ibid.
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Debattista 3 1 is of the opinion that the rule put forward by the judges in
Glynn v Margetson is one of the 'devices' that 'protects the buyer against
the abuse by the carrier of a liberty to deviate'. In the case in question the
parties had contracted for a very wide liberty clause which covered ports
in any rotation in the listed specific seas.32 The ship, on leaving the
loading port, went to the opposite direction and not towards the discharge
destination. Lord Herschell and Lord Halsbury both agreed that primacy
has to be given to the main purpose of the contract. In that case it was the
carriage of perishable cargo.33 Therefore, such a deviation that would not
accord with the way perishable cargo is traded would not be acceptable as
it would frustrate the whole purpose of the voyage. This is exactly what
had happened in the case in question as the cargo of oranges was
damaged on discharge due to the delay in proceeding to the agreed
destination. Cumulative effect of both court decisions suggests that
generally even if there is a wide liberty to deviate clause a ship is only
permitted to call at ports, without unreasonable delay which could raise a
possibility of frustration, which in a business perspective could be said to
be in between the loading and discharge port. Therefore, it can be said
that Charles Debattista was on the right track to call the Glynn v
Margetson rule one of the 'devices' 34 in the law of carriage of goods by
sea against the exploitation of liberty clauses.
A strange approach was taken in James Morrison Ltd. v Shaw Savill
and Albion Company.3 5 There it was held that a certain port only 54 miles
off course was not an intermediate port and, therefore, sailing to it was an
unreasonable deviation. Authors of Voyage Charters expressed the
opinion that in this case the Court of Appeal judges 'seem to have been
influenced by the fact that [Le Harve] was not a usual port of call for
ships... and interpreted the liberty clause as being intended merely to
permit the ship to call at ports usually visited'.36 I would agree with the
expressed view that this construction of the contract terms divests the
liberty to deviate clause of most of its importance as then the only ports
31 Charles Debattista, The Sale of Goods Carried by Sea, (2nd edn, Butterworths 1998)
143-145.
32 [1893] AC 351 (HL), 353.
33 ibid 355, 357.
34 Debattista, The Sale of Goods Carried by Sea (n 31) 143.
35 [1916] 2 KB 783.
36 Cooke et al, Voyage Charters (n 6) 258.
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of call would be the ones that are used by the majority of ships on that
particular shipping line. I am of the opinion that James Morrison has to
be read cautiously as it ignores the dicta in Glynn v Margetson and Leduc
v Ward where it can be said that unreasonable deviation is only when a
ship goes in the wrong direction or disregards the nature of the cargo
carried. The correct view has to be that of Swinfen Eady L.J.37 that it all
depends on specific circumstances. That raises a debate whether the
Court of Appeal was right in James Morrison in saying that 54 miles is so
far off the shipping business practice to call at ports 'substantially ... on
the named voyage' 3 8 that it constitutes an unreasonable deviation. My
position would be those 54 miles were most probably insignificant when
taking the whole trip from New Zealand to London into account.
Simon Baughen in his article 'Does deviation still matter?' asked an
interesting question whether liberty clauses can be constructed as to cover
every voyage irrespective of the destination and the nature of the cargo
carried.3 9 He based his view on the speech of Atkin, L.J. in The Cap
Palos4 0 case where he suggested that a specifically worded exception
clause might exclude ship owner's liability for any breach of contract
including a deviation. This statement can be said to contradict with the
tendency in English law to limit the use of exclusion clauses, especially
the all-encompassing ones that exclude all types of liability. Main
statutory tools designed to restrict the use of exclusion clauses are the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (hereinafter - UCTA 1977) and the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (hereinafter -
UTCCR 1999). It would be all plain sailing if those Acts had full effect
on contracts of carriage. Unfortunately (or fortunately from the ship
owner's point of view), UCTA 1977 applies only to certain aspects of
shipping contracts.4 1 While section 2 of the UCTA 1977 greatly restricts
the use of exemption clauses that limit negligence liability, section 2(c) in
Schedule 1 of the UCTA 1977 states that only section 2(1) extends to
'any contract for the carriage of goods by ship or hovercraft'; 'but subject
to this sections 2 to 4 and 7 do not extend to any such contract except in
37 James Morrison Ltd. v Shaw Savill and Albion Company [1916] 2 KB 783 795.
38 As per Leduc v Ward (1888) 20 QBD 482.
39 Baughen, 'Does deviation still matter?' (n 1) 77.
40 (1921) 8 Lloyd's Rep 309, 312.
41 Richard Stone, The Modern Law of Contract (9h edn, Routledge 2011) 235, 236.
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favor of a person dealing as a consumer'. Similar restricting provisions
are to be found in section 3 in Schedule 1 of the UCTA 1977. In result
any contract for the carriage of goods by sea is only subject to s. 2(1) of
the UCTA 1977 which covers death or personal injury resulting from
negligence. As these contingencies have no connection with unreasonable
deviation and since in almost most cases neither party to a contract for the
carriage of goods by sea are consumers, it is very unlikely that UCTA
1977 poses any threat for the drafting of wide liberty clauses in charter
parties and bills of lading.
UTCCR 1999 unlike UCTA 1977 apply to all types of contractual
provisions, not just the clauses that limit liability. What is more, UTCCR
1999 do not apply to any statement that is 'individually negotiated'4 2 and
generally apply only to 'unfair terms in contracts concluded between a
seller or a supplier and a consumer' .4 The main reason for enforcing such
a statutory intervention was to regulate standard consumer contracts.
Even if there are certain printed forms of charter parties and bills of
lading, contracts of affreightment are also based on the terms specifically
negotiated between the parties. We should also not forget that contracts
for the sale of goods carried by sea do not fall under the heading
'consumer contracts'. Taking that into account it is safe to say that terms
in contracts of affreightment are not subject to the harshness of the
UTCCR 1999 regime.
Where does that leave us? In the world where ship masters can sail
to any part of the ocean without having any regard in the main object of
the contract? To my mind, even if UCTA 1977 and UTCCR 1999 do not
figure in contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, business common
sense has to be taken as a guideline for not allowing exclusion clauses in
contracts that would give one of the parties complete freedom to negate
the purpose of that agreement. Another way of fighting such a mischief
would be to follow the view of Charles Debattista 44 that there is always
room for the contra proferentem rule of construction, in other words 'the
secret weapon' as Lord Denning called it in Mitchell (George)
42 UTCCR s 5(1).
43 ibid s 4(1).
44 Debattista, 'Fundamental Breach and Deviation in the Carriage of Goods by Sea'
(n 1) 22-36.
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(Chesterhall) Ltd. v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd ". The contra proferentem rule
should come into play when the liberty clause has been drafted by the
ship owner in which case it would be construed against him. The very
needed cherry on the top can be found in Lord Diplock's dicta in Photo
Productions v Securicor where he concluded that no matter how far
reaching is the freedom to contract for any exclusions or liberties, the
overriding factor is for the agreement to '...retain the legal characteristics
of a contract'.4 6
E. PERMISSIBLE DEVIATIONS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
HAGUE-VISBY RULES 47
No matter how strict the law generally is, there is always room for more
exceptions. Historically, the strictness of the deviation doctrine has
always been controlled by the rules of common law. These rules differ
from the liberty to deviate clauses which are contractual in nature in that
the common law rules protect the lives of people at sea, the ship and the
cargo carried. Under the common law regime deviation is considered to
be lawful when saving human life and when deviating so that danger to
the ship or cargo could be avoided.
The leading case which states that deviating for the purpose of
saving human life is justified is Scaramanga v Stamp.48 In this case a ship
Olympias had to carry a cargo from Cronstadt to Gibraltar. After sailing
for some time the crew spotted another ship which was in distress. A
significant point in the case was that the ship itself was not in any danger
of becoming a total loss. The crew onboard the Olympias could have
easily taken off the crew from the broken down ship. Instead of doing
that, Olympias towed the disabled ship into a port of safety in order to
acquire salvage. Cockburn CJ came to a conclusion that in this particular
case the deviation had two purposes.
45 [1983] 1 All ER 108.
46 [1980] AC 827, 850.
47 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (the 'Visby Amendments') (adopted 23
February 1968, entered into force 23 June 1977) 1412 UNTS 127 (Hague-Visby
Rules).
48 (1880) 5 CPD 295.
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Per Cockburn CJ:
...deviation for the purpose of saving life is protected, and involves neither
forfeiture of insurance nor liability to the goods' owner... And, as a necessary
consequence of foregoing, deviation for the purpose of communicating with a
ship in distress is allowable, inasmuch as the state of the vessel in distress may
involve danger to life. On the other hand, deviation for the sole purpose of
saving property is not thus privileged, but entails all the usual consequences of
deviation... If, therefore, the lives of the persons on board a disabled ship can
be saved without saving the ship, as by taking them off, deviation for the
purpose of saving the ship will carry with it all the consequences of an
unauthorized deviation. 49
Without doubt the reasoning is based on the fundamental concept of
mankind to help one another in all life-threatening situations. It is a moral
duty that each of us have to fulfill. That is why Cockburn CJ also asserted
that 'there is neither injustice nor hardship in treating both the merchant
and the insurer as making their contracts with the ship owner as subject to
this exception to the general rule of not deviating from the appointed
course'. 50 He concluded that because the grounds for justifying deviation
for the purpose of saving other property at sea are not so pivotal and are
basically based on a vague lucrative gain in favor of the ship owner, such
a deviation is not accepted under the common law regime.
The common law rule to save life is also strengthened by the fact
that legislative intervention has been introduced for the purpose of
imposing an obligation to save human life whilst at sea. International
Maritime Organization (hereinafter - IMO) which was established by the
United Nations in year 1958 is the most active international body in the
field of maritime law, more precisely in safety of shipping and prevention
of water pollution.5 1 IMO imposed international standards of shipping
safety by introducing the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) 52 and International Convention on Maritime Search
49 [1880] 5 CPD 295, 304.
50 ibid.
51International Maritime Organization 'Introduction to IMO'
<http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 20 August 2012.
52 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (adopted 1 November
1974, entered into force 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 3 (SOLAS).
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and Rescue 1979 (SAR) 53 . The significant element about these initiatives
is that SOLAS 5 4 as well as SAR55 include a general obligation upon the
masters of the ships to proceed in order to help those in serious danger.
Similar statutory obligations are imposed by the Merchant Shipping
Act 1995 upon the masters of the ships in the territorial waters of the
United Kingdom. Section 93 applies to both local and foreign ships and
provides that 'master of a ship.. .on receiving a signal of distress.. .shall
proceed with all speed to assistance of the persons in distress'.
In relation to the analysis above, it is important to note that deviation
in order to save other property at sea is not justified under the regime of
common law, however if the danger is imminent to the carrying ship the
master is permitted to go off course for the purpose of ensuring the safety
of the ship and the cargo carried.5 6 What is more, such danger has to be
not only imminent, but also of a 'reasonably permanent nature'.
The amount of weight that is put on the allowances to deviate for
the purpose averting danger to the lives of the crew, the ship and its cargo
can be seen in Kish v Taylor58 . The reason the ship became unsafe was
because the charterers did not provide a complete cargo and the master in
attempting to avoid dead freight sought out additional cargo which in
result made the ship unseaworthy. Lord Atkinson agreed that these
actions by the master were a breach of contract, however the deviation in
order to take refuge and have the cargo restowed was held to be lawful
because it was a deviation 'necessary to save his ship and the lives of his
crew' .5 Even if this deviation did not end the contract, the charterers still
retained the right to claim damages for the breach of contract. The broad
approach of Kish v Taylor was challenged in Monarch Steamship v
Karlshamns Oliefabriker6 0 where Lord Porter asserted that 'deviation
necessarily made to remedy unseaworthiness does not amount to
53 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (adopted 27 April
1979, entered into force 22 June 1985) 1403 UNTS (SAR).
54 SOLAS 2004, chapter 5.
s SAR s.2. 1.10: 'Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in
distress at sea'.
56 Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 12) 313.
5 ibid.
58 [1912] AC 604 (HL).
59 ibid 618.
60 [1949] AC 196.
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unjustifiable deviation.. .unless it is established that the owners knew of
the vessel's state on sailing'. 6' In that particular case there was no such
evidence, however if it were otherwise - the deviation would have been
held unjustified. This stems from the fundamental principle of law that no
one can profit from his own wrongful act.
Common law regime is slightly relaxed under the Hague, and the
Hague-Visby rules. The Hague and the revised Hague-Visby rules were
implemented in 1924 and 1968 respectively to achieve uniformity in
documentation used in the trade by sea. These rules have been
incorporated as a Schedule 1 to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971.
Newest amendment to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act made in 1992
has effect without prejudice to the application of Hague/Hague-Visby
rules.62 Therefore, where the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies,
article IV(4) of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules states the ambit of
permitted deviation. It provides that '...deviation in saving or attempting
to save life or property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be
deemed to be an infringement or breach of...the contract of carriage'. It
differs from the common law concept in that it is permissible to deviation
for the purpose of saving other property as well as any other 'reasonable
deviation'. That means the justified deviation doctrine under
Hague/Hague-Visby rules encompasses a broader view of what amounts
to a reasonable deviation. A clear example of the relaxed approach is
shown in Stag Line v Foscolo Mango and Co where deviation in order to
land two engineers who were making sure that the ship engine was
working efficiently was held to be reasonable.63
F. EFFECT OF BREACH
The above analysis of the intricacies of the deviation doctrine, its origins
and what amounts to justified or unjustified deviation is important in
discussing the legal effects of an unreasonable deviation. The issue of
what happens after deviation occurs has been an area of maritime law
cloaked with uncertainty. As has been said above, in the times when wide
liberty clauses and held covered clauses were still a thing of the future
unreasonable deviation always resulted in a lapsed cargo insurance
61 [1949] AC 196, 212.
62 s 5(5) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.
63 [1932] AC 328, 343.
128
Is the Doctrine ofDeviation only a Historical Record Today?
policy. In the words of C.P. Mills that 'upon deviating the carrier was
said to become an insurer of the goods'. 6 4 Therefore, the owner of a
deviating ship immediately became strictly liable for the cargo carried. In
consequence, all terms in the contract of carriage in favor of the ship
owner (exclusion clauses, liability limits, liberty clauses) were held not to
apply from the moment of deviation.
1. Years 1830 - 1890
These years were both fortunate and unfortunate for the development of
the deviation doctrine. Both fortunate and unfortunate events are
essentially connected with one case - Davis v Garrett. The deviation
doctrine in the form of express provisions in carriage contracts existed
long before Davis v Garrett, however this particular case acknowledged
that a sea carrier has an implied duty to follow usual and customary
course towards the final port of discharge. Furthermore, this case also
stated that the ship owner was liable for the losses that occurred during a
deviation. The unfortunate part of the case in question was that the ship
owner did not argue that there were standard exclusions in the contract as
to the contingencies on the voyage. In result, this case neither dealt with
how the exclusion clauses function after the deviation, nor what happens
to the contract once an unreasonable deviation occurs. Martin Dockray
concurs that Davis v Garrett is a case of limited significance as the
approaches presented were not 'a novelty' in the law at that particular
time and because there are no clear explanations as to the conclusions
made, especially why the court believed that there should be an implied
obligation not to deviate. 66 What is more, the case also did not rule on
who would be held liable for losses arising after the ship regained the
course. This issue still remained uncertain even in 1880 as the judge did
not even consider such a possibility. 6 7
2. Years 1890 - 1936
This period brought new light to the deviation doctrine. That light is very
dim with regard to the modem developments in breach of contract and
64 Mills, 'The future of deviation in the law of the carriage of goods' (n 1) 587.
65 (1830) 6 Bing 716, 725.
66 Dockray, Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 8) 63, 64.
67 Scaramanga v Stamp (1879) LR 4 CPD 316, 321.
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nowadays might survive only as a historical fact, however the importance
of the case stems from the fact that it was a step forward in the
advancement of the deviation doctrine no matter how far off course. The
first of the two core decisions in this period is Balian and Sons v Joly,
68Victoria and Co. Ltd. In this case, instead of making the issue of breach
more clear, Lord Esher, despite his opening remarks saying that the 'case
is clear', brought even more confusion into the matter. On the up side, the
Court of Appeal held that the unjustified deviation doctrine deprived the
carrier of the rights to enforce the exception clauses contained in the
contract of carriage. That would have been a sensible step forward for the
deviation doctrine if not for the reasoning of Lord Esher which was based
on the fact that deviation constitutes a change of voyage as contracted and
thus after the deviation 'the whole bill of lading [was] gone'. 69 Lord
Justice Fry and Lord Justice Lopes concurred. The remarkable thing
about Lord Esher's view is that it was inconsistent with the orthodox law
at that time. Freeman v Taylor70 and Davidson v Gwynne are good
examples that when Balian was decided the established view was that the
deviation in question had to deprive the cargo owner of the whole benefit
of the contract in order for him to gain the privilege to end the contract.72
Things did not turn to the bright side with the decision in Joseph
Thorley Ltd v Orhis Steamship CO7 3 either. To my mind, there is a very
simple answer to why Orhis Steamship did not develop the doctrine in the
correct direction. As can be seen from the judgments of J.A. Hamilton,
K.C, Collins M.R., Cozens-Hardy L.J. and Fletcher Moulton L.J. 74 the
unfortunate fact was that the judges rightly held Balian as authority in
Orhis Steamship Co for two main reasons. Firstly, the facts of both cases
were almost indistinguishable and, secondly, Balian was an earlier Court
of Appeal decision that the subsequent court could not have not moved
away from. In Orhis Steamship damage to the goods was done by the
stevedores in the process of discharging the ship. The bill of lading
contained a broad exception clause exempting the ship owners from
68 (1890) 6 TLR 345.
69 ibid 345.
70 (1831) 8 Bing 124, 136, 137.
71(1810) 104 ER 149, 152, 153.
72 Dockray, Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 8) 71.
73 [1907] 1 KB 660.
74 ibid 663, 665, 666, 667.
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liability for loss arising from '...any act, neglect, or default whatsoever of
the.. .stevedores... . All the judges in Orhis Steamship were of the
opinion that the obligation not to deviate has an effect of a condition.
Collins M.R.76 drew parallel lines between the newly introduced
'condition' not to deviate with that of seaworthiness obligation in a
voyage charter. He stressed out that a breach of an obligation not to
deviate goes to 'the root of the contract' and '...its performance is a
condition precedent to the right of the ship owner to put the contract in
suit'. In simple terms that would mean the contract is displaced as from
inception including any exception or limitation clauses. This is what
English law would call rescission ab initio. As the law stands right now
this was neither the correct terminology, nor the right approach.
The established general rule of contract law is that where a breach
of term is considered to be a repudiatory breach, all terms of the contract
remain intact up until the innocent party accepts the repudiation.7 7
Unaccepted repudiation does not have any legal effect. The toughest
question which still baffles the common law experts is whether this
general rule applies to deviation cases. If it does, then the ship owner has
the right to rely on any terms in his favor until the date of the election to
accept the repudiation, including any exception or liberty clauses.
However, as we can clearly see the reasoning in Orhis Steamship was
based on entirely different grounds and thus departed from the general
contract law. Striking feature of this case is that it has never been
overruled. Two years after Orhis Steamship the stridency of the
'condition precedent' rule was given full effect in International Guano en
Superphospaten-Werken v Robert MacAndrew & Co Ltd where the
shipowners were not allowed to rely on exception clause as to the damage
done before the unreasonable deviation occurred.78 A 'further extreme' as
Stephen Girvin put it 7 9 can be found in a case of US Shipping Board v
Bunge y Born8 0 where the terms concerning demurrage fees on discharge
were said to be ineffective because the contract had been avoided ab
7 ibid 661.
76 ibid 667.
7 J. H. S. Cooke et al, Voyage Charters (n 6), 264
78 [1909] 2 KB 360.
79 Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 12) 317.
80 (1925) 42 TLR 174.
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initio. The analysis of the cases decided between the years 1890 - 1936
proves that in this period a breach as to the voyage course, no matter how
trivial, was considered to be of fundamental importance and thus meant
that the contract automatically came to an end depriving the ship owner
of any right to rely on terms which were drafted in his favor. These views
were not on par with the practice of including held covered clauses in
cargo insurance contracts providing for cover in exchange for additional
premium as well as not justified enough to hold the ship owner liable for
events which had happened before the change of course. It goes without
saying that the law was in need of reform.
3. 1936 and Beyond
It is rather unfortunate to see that not even the later case of Hain
Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd8 1 solved all the problems.
Nevertheless, this case was the first case where the House of Lords
thoroughly analysed the deviation doctrine. Tregenna, the chartered ship,
was to load a cargo of sugar from Cuba and San Domingo. After loading
at two Cuban ports Tregenna proceeded towards the port of Queenstown
whilst awaiting for the nomination of the San Domingo port. The
nomination was not delivered to the master of the ship due to a fault of
the shipowner's agents. Once the charterers spotted the error, the master
of the ship was immediately ordered back to San Domingo to load the
remaining cargo. On leaving the last loading port the ship ran aground
and lost part of the cargo. The crucial finding of the House of Lords in his
case was that even a trivial deviation constituted a breach of 'such a
serious character' that it went to 'the root of the contract' and that the
innocent party was entitled 'to declare himself as no longer bound by any
of the contract terms'. 8 2 In result, Hain introduced a modified concept of
repudiatory breach where the innocent party could either elect to treat the
contract as at end and sue for damages or keep it alive by affirming it. At
first sight it might seem like the repudiatory or fundamental breach
doctrine that is effective today, but deeper analysis reveals core
differences. Firstly, even though Hain accepted that after the deviation
the contract does not automatically come to an end, once the choice to
8 (1936) 55 L. L. Rep. 159.
82 ibid 173, 174.
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end the contract is made by the innocent party, the contract is held as not
to have existed. This does not come into terms with general contract law
as it is established today, because according to the orthodox view the
primary obligations under the contract continue up until the moment the
innocent party chooses to accept the repudiation. Secondly, Lord Atkin
asserted that even if the deviation was immaterial to the entire voyage and
had not had any effect on the condition of the cargo, it still amounted to a
fundamental breach of contract. Such a statement does seem to support
the nowadays orthodox view that fundamental breach is one which
deprives the innocent party of the whole benefit of the contract.83 That
raises a question whether a trivial deviation which did not contribute to
the damage of the cargo could amount to a fundamental breach of
contract. To my mind, in the majority of cases such a deviation would not
be relevant. Therefore, instead of formally treating every deviation as a
fundamental breach, emphasis should be put on the construction of the
terms of the contract and the severity of the breach. 84
What the judges in Hain tried to introduce is the now forgotten
fundamental breach doctrine which was so stubbornly argued by Lord
Denning. In Suisse Atlantique ship owners argued that demurrage clause
could not be relied upon by the charterers as the breaches of contract
which caused the delays constituted a fundamental breach. Viscount
Dilhorne, Lord Hodson, and Lord Wilberforce clearly reasoned that there
is no fundamental breach as a rule of law and that the application of
exclusion clauses is subject to the construction of the contract as a
whole. 86 The outcome of Suisse Atlantique was radically misinterpreted
by Lord Denning in non-deviation case of Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. v
Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd where it was held that there are certain
fundamental breaches of contract that end the contract and cancel all
exclusion clauses available for the party in breach. 7 Lord Denning's view
and erroneous interpretation of Suisse Atlantique only survived until the
House of Lords reached a decision in Photo Productions v Securicor.
83 Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [ 1962] 2 QB 26, 66.
84 H. G. Beale, Chitty on Contracts (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 928, 929.
85 [1967] 1 AC 361.
86 ibid 392, 399, 405, 410, 425, 431, 432.
87 [1970] 1 QB 447.
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There Lord Wilberforce8 8 rejected Harbutt's view and pointed out that
the reasoning of Lord Denning in that judgment was 'radically
inconsistent with the Suisse Atlantique case'.8 9 The judges in Photo
Productions v Securicor denied that there is a rule of law as to
fundamental breach, reaffirmed the view adopted in Suisse Atlantique in
that everything depends on the true construction of the contract terms and
that a breach does not automatically deny reliance on limitation clauses.
Another important finding in the case was that no term can be regarded as
fundamental, unless it is a condition agreed upon by both parties. 9 0
It might rightfully seem that after Photo Productions v Securicor
there should not be any problems with the effect of breach in deviation
cases. However, that is a wrong assumption for two main reasons. Firstly,
Photo Productions v Securicor had nothing to do with carriage of goods
by sea, ships or deviation for that matter. Secondly, the core reason for
stating that fundamental breach doctrine is a thing of the past was the
statutory intervention in 1977 in the form of UCTA 1977. As mentioned
before, this Act allowed for exception clauses to be applied with
reference to the test of reasonableness. With regard to limited application
of UCTA 1977 to carriage of goods contracts there seems to be a broken
link between the still not overruled Hain and Photo Productions v
Securicor. A further difficulty is presented by the fact that the outcasting
of fundamental breach doctrine is to be found in a case dealing with
general contract law principles. These facts did not slip past Lord
Wilberforce. In Photo Productions v Securicor he argued that the
Harbutt's case seems to support the doctrine adopted in Hain. And while
that may be true, deviation cases cannot be read as laying down general
principles of contract law that differ from the views exposed in Photo
Productions v Securicor. Conversely, Lord Wilberforce was of the
opinion that Hain and the doctrine adopted to deviation cases can be
regarded as 'body of authority sui generis with special rules derived from
historical and commercial reasons'. 91 One might ask what led Lord
Wilberforce to such a conclusion? For a body of law to be considered
autonomous there has to be certain core elements that distinguish it from
88 [1980] AC 827, 841 [A]-[G].
89 ibid 844.
90 ibid 849.
91 ibid 845.
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other sources of law. A vague statement of 'historical and commercial
reasons' might have been enough if Lord Wilberforce had provided a
deeper explanation into why the rules of deviation have to be preserved.
However, such an explanation can be found in law literature. Professor
Brian Coote argues that deviation cases essentially deal with bailment
obligations and that throughout the twentieth century the law has
muddled together deviation rules, discharge for breach and the doctrine of
fundamental breach. 92 According to Brian Coote the only 'true
explanation' for the deviation rules lies in the relationship between the
bailor and the bailee. The bailee can only rely on the contract terms that
were drafted in his favor as long as the bailee does not stray away from
the instructions in the bilateral agreement. C.P. Mills expresses the same
view by stating that deviation in carriage of goods by sea has to be
regarded on the same footing as in carriage of goods by land as well as in
other bailment cases. 93 Christopher M.C. Cashmore also contends that
one cannot depart from general bailment theory when dealing with
deviation on either land or sea.94 It is very important to note that neither
Professor Coote nor C.P. Mills or Christopher M.C. Cashmore are
opposing the orthodox view of Photo Productions v Securicor. C.P. Mills
is of the opinion that it would be 'against the spirit of law' to say that
deviation is still very relevant after the judgments in Photo Productions v
Securicor.9 5 However, the fact that these writers do not ignore the impact
of bailment theory on the deviation doctrine might help in the attempt to
grasp the reason why Lord Wilberforce chose to label deviation cases as
'sui generis'.
Needless to say that there would not be such a vast array of law
literature on deviation doctrine if the 'sui generis' contention would be
the accepted view. On the contrary, it is the view of the minority. Martin
Dockray, 96 John Livermore, 97 Stephen Girvin,98 Charles Debattista99 and
92 Brian Coote, 'The Second Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach' (1981) 55 ALJ
788-790.
93 Mills, 'The future of deviation in the law of the carriage of goods' (n 1) 587, 588.
94 Cashmore, 'The legal nature of the doctrine of deviation' (n 1) 494, 495.
95 Mills (n 1) 596.
96 Dockray, 'Deviation: a doctrine all at sea?' (n 1) 98.
97 Livermore, 'Deviation, Deck Cargo and Fundamental Breach' (n 1) 264, 265.
98 Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (n 12) 321.
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Simon Baughenioo clearly favor the notion that deviation rules should not
be separated from the principles of general contract law. Charles
Debattista strongly argues that the view which is based on bailment
theory and is in favor of separating deviation doctrine from general
contract law appears to be 'slightly too elegant for comfort'. He restricts
Professor Coote's bailment explanation to the development of the
doctrine and contends that it does not stretch as to give grounds for the
survival of the doctrine. Simon Baughen follows the views exposed in
Photo Productions v Securicor and supports the amalgamation of
deviation rules with general contract law. What is more, Simon Baughen
concluded his article 'Does deviation still matter?' with a statement
which not only undoubtedly answered the question in the affirmative but
which might also be considered as one of the boldest statements on
deviation doctrine. He was of the opinion that deviation rules should be
'speedily buried' and that any problem concerning geographical deviation
'should be dealt with by the ordinary law of contract'. To my mind, such
a contention is too bold and out of date for two main of reasons. Firstly,
the reasoning in the case Kenya Railways v Antares Co Pte Ltd (The
Antares Nos. 1 & 2),1o1 which is what led the learned writer to affirm the
burial of deviation doctrine concerned non-geographical deviation (so
called 'quasi-deviation') in the form of on-deck carriage. Therefore, the
statement that all problems connected with a deviation from geographical
course should now be read as to accommodate the reasoning in The
Antares is not entirely accurate. Secondly, The Antares deals exclusively
with a situation where Hague-Visby Rules apply and are silent on
whether it extends as to cover carriage contracts to which Hague-Visby
Rules do not have an imperative effect. Thirdly, the learned writer's
article was published before a very similar decision in The Kapitan Petko
Voivoda again focusing on non-geographical deviation where Longmore
L.J. left the doors open if only slightly ajar for the deviation doctrine to
*102
survive.10
99 Debattista, 'Fundamental Breach and Deviation in the Carriage of Goods by Sea'
(n 1) 35, 36.
100 Baughen, 'Does deviation still matter?' (n 1) 98.
101 [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 633; [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 424(hereinafter - The Antares)
102 [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, [13]-[15].
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We are now left to consider whether there is a clear answer to the
problems created by the deviation rules. A proven liaison between
deviation and bailment might reinforce the opinion that deviation doctrine
should be a separate body of law, however, as has been suggested by a
number of law experts and judges, it is a far-fetched possibility. Norman
Palmer takes the middle ground and acknowledges that there a certain
elements of deviation that are characteristic of the bailment theory and
there are those that are in doubt.103 He asserts that the consequences
which the bailee has to face after an unreasonable deviation are three-
fold. Firstly, after the deviation occurs the bailee becomes strictly liable
for any damage to the goods. Held covered and liberty clauses are
convenient tools for avoiding such a situation, however that does not
deny the fact that these precautions were implemented as not to render the
ship owner / bailee liable under the general rule of bailment. Secondly,
unless otherwise agreed, upon the happening of an unjustified deviation
the bailee is divested of the right of possession to the goods. Thirdly,
unreasonable deviation is what triggers the cancellation of all exclusion
or limitation clauses provided for in the agreement. Norman Palmer
contends that first two consequences are unique to bailment, whereas the
third one seems most likely to be of exclusively contractual nature. He
goes on to conclude that the third consequence might signify the
differences between the traditional deviation doctrine as per Hain and
non-bailment contracts. The former recognises automatic discharge upon
breach, while the latter is based on the rule that a repudiation does not
have any legal effect until it is accepted by the innocent party. This is
what Photo Productions v Securicor was all about albeit unfortunately
not in the realms of law on carriage of goods by sea.
Having considered the opinions expressed by various law experts,
the only question left to answer is whether most recent (post-Photo
Productions v Securicor) court decisions have brought any light into the
matter. The most important decisions are The Antares and The Kapitan
Petko Voivoda. The common distinct feature of these cases is that the
issue before the courts was one of non-geographical deviation. Non-
geographical or quasi-deviation concept was first established in the
United States of America where the courts came to a conclusion that
103 Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 66.
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other types of breaches done by the ship owner could also amount to a
deviation.10 4 Justification for such an extension of the doctrine could be
based on the fact that any variation in the carriage of the cargo is subject
to an increased risk and therefore might be rightfully called a deviation.
While initially the American courts were inclined to limit quasi-deviation
to unauthorized deck carriage, the US quasi-deviation doctrine has now
been extended as to cover delay in delivery, unauthorized towage,
intentional destruction and other breaches committed by the ship
owner.1os The English cases in question concern deck carriage in breach
of contract and package limitation under the Hague-Visby Rules. In The
Antares the claimants argued that because there was no authorization to
stow the goods on deck such a breach was of fundamental nature and
therefore deprived the shipowners of the possibility to rely on the one
year time bar provided for in Hague-Visby Rules article III, para 6. In this
case Lloyd L.J.10 6 had no hesitation in concluding that the doctrine of
fundamental breach does not exist anymore and that exception clauses
cannot be cancelled out automatically. He affirmed the dicta found in
Photo Productions v Securicor that it all depends on the true construction
of the contract and also favored the notion of assimilating deviation cases
into general contract law. As to the question on the application of Hague-
Visby Rules Lloyd L.J. espoused the view that two main factors
contribute to the end effect that article III, para 6 applies.' 07 The first one
being of a formalistic nature that a wording 'whatsoever' which was
missing from the Hague Rules 0 8 article III makes the time limit
applicable under the Hague-Visby Rules even in the event of deviation.
The second contributing factor that led to the application of article III,
para 6 was that Hague-Visby Rules have been given a force of law under
the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971 section 1(2).
The strength of the latter argument has to be weighed against the
dicta of one older case of Stag Line Ltd v Fascolo Mango and Co Ltd
104 Theodora Nikaki, 'The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine' (2004) 35 Journal ofMaritime
Law & Commerce 45, 48-50.
105 ibid 60-71.
106 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 424, 429, 430.
107 ibid.
108 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to
Bills of Lading (adopted 25 August 1924, entered into force 2 June 1931) 120 LNTS
155 (Hague Rules).
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which dealt with the application of the Hague Rules and has never been
overruled. 109 In that case, the Court of Appeal held that the traditional
doctrine of deviation survives even where the Hague Rules are
applicable. While the force of law to the Hague-Visby Rules was given
by the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971 section 1(2)110, there were no
such provisions in Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1924. The fact that the
latter edition of the Act was in force when Stag Line was decided
persuaded the House of Lords to decide that deviation doctrine persisted
even where the parties had chosen to incorporate Hague Rules into their
bills of lading."' Now why would anyone think this older case dealing
with an earlier edition of the Hague Rules is of any significance today?
Well, firstly, because this case was decided in the House of Lords,
whereas The Antares is a decision of the Court of Appeal. Secondly, The
Antares deals specifically with the imperative application of the Hague-
Visby Rules and leaves the question open as to whether the same
approach applies to other situations. Thirdly, unlike The Antares which
dealt with deck storage, Stag Line was actually a case about geographical
deviation. I do not think it would be wrong to conclude that these factors
raise a question as to the general application of The Antares to all aspects
of deviation, more specifically the traditional geographical deviation.
These doubts were deepened further in The Kapitan Petko Voivoda.
This was another case of the Court of Appeal on non-geographical
deviation. While in parallel with The Antares it represents a strong move
towards depriving deviation doctrine of any place in English law, we are
left to wonder why the judges still do not make the final decision. The
facts of the case are not as important as the finding of Longmore L.J. that
deviation cases cannot be considered as a 'broad principle of general
acceptation' l2. He further contended that there is an important question
of whether deviation rules 'exemplify even a principle of English law'.
Such notions are of strong character and are in accordance with the view
expressed by Lloyd L.J. in The Antares. However, that does not answer
the query why Longmore L.J. concluded the reasoning by saying that it is
109 [1932] AC 328.
110 Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1992 s 5(5) states that Hague-Visby Rules remain
as a force of law.
. [1932] AC 328, 342-343, 346-347.
112 [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, [13]-[15].
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not that deviation principles do not exist anymore, but that the parties
cannot attain any benefit from the 'supposed principle' in the matter at
hand. It is undoubtedly clear that the lack of final judicial willpower and
determination to sink the doctrine for good is what drives the controversy
surrounding the deviation doctrine.
E. CONCLUSION
The ancient roots of the deviation doctrine are still talked about today. It
cannot be said that a doctrine which survived for more than three
centuries is of no relevance to the modern developments of maritime law.
While Longmore L.J. in The Kapitan Petko Voivoda denied any chance
of deviation doctrine being a 'broad principle of general application', the
United States courts have broadened the doctrine to cover other breaches
of contract as well. As far as English law is concerned, the introduction of
liberty to deviate, held covered clauses have been triggered by the effect
of deviation on shipping contracts. The theory on proper voyage route,
justified and unjustified deviations without any doubt have an influence
on deviations generally. In that respect the development of the doctrine
on deviation cannot be written down to history books and left to dust as
its importance cannot be denied.
A slightly different approach might be taken when talking about
the consequences of an unreasonable deviation. Has the traditional
deviation doctrine as it applies geographical deviation been completely
abolished by Swiss Atlantique, Photo Productions v Securicor, The
Antares and The Kapitan Petko Voivoda? The majority of law experts and
the judiciary seem to think so. However, one cannot turn a Nelsonian
blind eye to the doubts expressed by Lord Wilberforce in Photo
Productions v Securicor and Longmore L.J. in The Kapitan Petko
Voivoda and also the works of law academics who support the notion that
deviation might still have a beating heart. What is more, there has not
been a decision as of yet in the Supreme Court (ex-House of Lords)
concerning either quasi-deviation or geographical deviation that would
bury all the hopes on the doctrine's continued survival. Can we then
boldly state that deviation is a thing of the past? I would definitely agree
with the views expressed by Christopher M.C. Cashmore in his reply
article to Charles Debattista's 'Fundamental breach and deviation in the
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carriage of goods by sea' that there are still things left to consider and it
cannot be that the House of Lords in Photo Productions v Securicor had
meant to overrule Orhis Steamship, Hain and Stag Line without even
referring to them in any way. To my mind, that would be an astounding
notion and I personally refrain from accepting it.
